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Seasonal variability and a farmer's supply
response to protein premiums and discounts
{
Rob Fraser*
This article extends the analysis of the impact of a system of protein premiums
and discounts to that on a farmer's planned production. Despite an unambiguously
negative impact on expected pro¢ts of equally likely premiums and discounts,
supply response to the introduction of such a system is shown to depend on the
level of seasonal variability faced by the farmer. In particular, farmers in regions
which are more seasonally unreliable are likely to feature a negative supply
response, whereas those in regions which are more seasonally reliable are likely to
feature a positive supply response. Consequently, it is suggested that, overall,
protein payments for wheat may have encouraged a shift of wheat-growing activity
away from more seasonally unreliable areas.
1. Introduction
The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) has recently introduced a system of
premiums and discounts for protein levels in wheat. With this system higher
prices are paid if measured protein exceeds a speci¢ed level, while a price
discount is applied if measured protein is below a speci¢ed level.
For farmers, the impact of this system on income from wheat-growing is
complicated by the fact that the relationship between yield and protein
depends on uncertain seasonal conditions. In particular, because yield and
protein are jointly determined by uncertain seasonal conditions through an
inverse relationship (given available nitrogen), a farmer will ¢nd that, in the
presence of protein payments, seasons of relatively high yield tend to
coincide with relatively low protein content and therefore relatively low
prices. As shown in Fraser (1997), this negative correlation between price
and yield means that the introduction of a protein payments system centred
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The aim of this article is to extend the analysis of the impact of a protein
payments system to that on a farmer's planned production. At ¢rst glance it
may be expected that, for a farmer concerned primarily with the level of
expected pro¢ts from wheat growing, the negative impact of protein
payments on this level would also mean a reduction in planned production.
However, in a model of a risk-neutral farmer making an optimal planned
production decision, it is shown that the actual supply response may be
positive or negative depending on the level of seasonal variability, and
despite a uniformly negative impact on the level of expected pro¢ts. This
result arises because the introduction of protein payments modi¢es the
condition determining optimal planned production in two con£icting ways.
First, as recognised above, it introduces a negative e¡ect through the
negative correlation between price and yield. But second, by creating the
opportunity for the farmer to reduce the probability of a discount and
increase the probability of a premium through increased application of
nitrogen (which is shared between yield and protein), the system also has a
positive e¡ect on the level of planned production. Moreover, the level of
seasonal variability determines the relative strength of these two con£icting
e¡ects, with the negative e¡ect increasing in magnitude relative to the
positive e¡ect with the level of seasonal variability. The potential therefore
exists for the balance of these two e¡ects at a lower level of seasonal
variability to be reversed at a higher level.
The layout of the article is as follows. The ¢rst section develops in detail
the model outlined above, focusing in particular on the impact of the protein
payments system on the ¢rst order condition for optimal planned production
by a risk-neutral farmer.
2 The second section uses numerical analysis to
illustrate the role of the level of seasonal variability in determining the
direction of this impact. The article ends with a brief conclusion.
1The implications for expected income of an asymmetrically-positioned system are quite
straightforward. In particular, protein payments centred above the initial protein/expected
yield level increase the likelihood of a discount and therefore have a stronger negative
impact on expected pro¢t. The reverse applies for a system centred below the initial level.
2Although the stabilising impact of protein payments on the variability of income can
be expected to have a positive impact on the planned production of a risk-averse farmer, this
feature of the supply response to protein payments is considered to be of a second order of
importance compared with the expected pro¢t impact. Therefore, in order to simplify the
analysis, further consideration of its role is omitted.
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Themodel,basedonthatdevelopedinFraser(1997),speci¢esafarmer'sexpected
levelEoIofwheatincomeperhectareintheabsenceofproteinpaymentsas:
EoI   p yN 1
where
 p  expected price per tonne
 yN  expected yield given the level of available nitrogen, N:
Note that this speci¢cation assumes the farmer's uncertain price and season
are independent.
It is further assumed that yield y and protein r are jointly determined
by uncertain seasonal conditions through an inverse relationship (given
available nitrogen):
3
r  gN=y 2
where
gN  function relating to soil type and available nitrogen g
0N > 0;
and that yield uncertainty (and therefore protein uncertainty) has a
multiplicative relationship with seasonal uncertainty y;Ey  1:
y  y yN: 3
The system of protein payments x is speci¢ed as:
 pH   p  x if y < g=rH y
 pM   p if g=rH y  y  g=rL  y
 pL   p ÿ x if y > g=rL  y
4
where
rL  critical low protein level
rH  critical high protein level
 pH  expected price with protein premium
 pL  expected price with protein discount
rH ÿ g= y  g= y ÿ rL:4
3This speci¢cation is consistent with preliminary scienti¢c evidence. See Robinson
(1995) for details.
4Note that it is not statistically precise to refer to g= y as the expected protein level  r
because r is an hyperbolic function of y.
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Since for y symmetrically distributed, w3 exceeds w1, the second term on the
right-hand side of equation 5 is negative and so for given N:
E1I < EoI: 6
Consider now the impact of the introduction of the protein payments system
on the optimal level of planned production. In the absence of the system,
expected pro¢t Eop per hectare is given by:
Eop  EoI ÿ c:N ÿ F 7
where
c  cost per unit of nitrogen
F  fixed costs per hectare:
Consequently, optimal planned production is given by:
 p@ yN=@N  c: 8
Whereas in the presence of protein payments expected pro¢t E1p per
hectare is given by:
E1p  EoI   yxw1 ÿ w3 ÿ c:N ÿ F 9
so that optimal planned production is given by:
5
 p  xw1 ÿ w3@ yN=@N   yxfg=rH y  fg=rL  y  c 10
where
fg=rH y  value of the probability density function of y at g=rH y
fg=rL  y  value of the probability density function of y at g=rL  y:
5Note that this derivative assumes an increase in available nitrogen is `shared' between
yield and protein for a given value of y. This assumption seems consistent with scienti¢c
evidence and is represented algebraically by:
@g=y y=@N > 0:
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smaller than the left-hand side of equation 8. This is the manifestation of the
negative impact of protein payments on expected income at the level of the
marginal expected income from increased planned production. However, the
second term on the left-hand side of equation 10 is positive and represents
the opportunity both to decrease the likelihood of a discount and to increase
the likelihood of a premium that follows from increasing planned production
by increasing nitrogen and the associated sharing of this nitrogen between
yield and protein. Consequently, a comparison of equations 8 and 10 shows
that the overall impact of the introduction of protein payments on the
optimal level of planned production as algebraically ambiguous. Never-
theless, it can be seen from equation 10 that the relative strength of these
con£icting e¡ects depends on the level of seasonal variability. In particular, a
greater level of seasonal variability can be expected to increase the
magnitude of w3 relative to w1, thereby increasing the magnitude of the
negative e¡ect on  y in equation 10. Moreover, a greater level of seasonal
variability typically reduces the value of the probability density function at a
given point, thereby reducing the magnitude of the positive e¡ect on  y in
equation 10. Consequently, the potential exists for two farmers, who di¡er
only in terms of their respective levels of seasonal variability, to have
opposite supply responses to the introduction of a protein payments system.
This situation is illustrated numerically in the next section.
3. Numerical analysis
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of the model developed in the
previous section the yield response function is assumed to take the
Mitscherlich form:
6
 y  m1 ÿ de
ÿbN 11
where
m  maximum yield
d  axis parameter
b  curvature parameter.
In addition, the functional relationship between protein, yield and nitrogen
is speci¢ed as:
6See Paris (1992) for details of empirical support for this functional form.
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This form satis¢es the requirement of the model that, for given seasonal
conditions y, additional nitrogen is shared between yield and protein.
7
Finally, it is assumed that the probability density function of seasonal
conditions can be represented by the normal distribution. On this
basis:
8





w3  1 ÿ FgN=rL  y 1 
syZgN=rL  y




ZgN=rH y  ordinate of the standard normal distribution at the value of y
corresponding to the high critical protein level
ZgN=rL  y  ordinate of the standard normal distribution at the value of y
corresponding to the low critical protein level
FgN=rH y  cumulative probability of y being less than gN=rH y
FgN=rL  y  cumulative probability of y being less than gN=rL  y
sy  standard deviation of y:
Note that this distributional assumption is consistent with the requirement
of the model that y be symmetrically distributed.
Turning to the parameter values for the numerical analysis, base case





 p  200:
7See footnote 5 for further details.
8See Fraser (1988) for this derivation.
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initial optimal values:
 yo  100:00 No  19:37
Eop  6440:25:
The base case speci¢cation of the protein payments system is as follows:
g  0:516 gNo= yo  0:1
rH  0:105
rL  0:095
x  10  pH  210;  pL  190:
Table 1 contains details of the optimal values for expected yield and pro¢ts
following the introduction of such a protein payments system for three levels
of seasonal variability.
9 This table con¢rms the result presented in equation
6 that such a symmetrically positioned protein payments system would
reduce expected pro¢ts regardless of the level of seasonal variability.
However, it also supports the suggestion made in relation to equation 10 that
the potential exists for the optimal supply response of two farmers who di¡er
only in terms of their respective levels of seasonal variability to have opposite
supply responses to the introduction of a protein payments system. In
particular, an increase in the level of seasonal variability increases the
relative strength of the negative e¡ect of protein payments both on expected
pro¢t and on marginal expected pro¢t. Table 1 shows that for sy  0:6 this
negative e¡ect outweighs the positive e¡ect relating to the opportunity both
to increase the likelihood of a premium and to decrease the likelihood of a
discount which follows from increasing nitrogen. Consequently, a farmer
with this level of seasonal variability responds to the introduction of the
protein payments system by reducing planned production, whereas farmers
Table 1 Results of the impact of introducing a protein payments system on
optimal expected yield and profits
 y Ep
No protein payments 100.00 6440.25
sy  0:2 100.49 6301.84
sy  0:4 100.13 6130.26
sy  0:6 99.95 5966.44
9Note that this range seems consistent with existing estimates of wheat yield variability
around Australia. See Anderson, Dillon, Hazell, Cowie and Wan (1988).
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to have a negative e¡ect on expected pro¢ts even if positioned symmetrically in
terms ofthe likelihood of a premiumordiscount,it couldreasonably beinferred
thatthisimpactwouldfeatureanegativesupplyresponse.
However, using a model developed in the ¢rst section it was shown that
the introduction of a protein payments system has two con£icting e¡ects on
the optimal level of planned production. The ¢rst is negative and follows
from the impact on expected pro¢ts. But the second is positive and relates to
the opportunity the farmer has both to reduce the probability of a discount
and to increase the probability of a premium through increased application
of nitrogen which is shared between yield and protein. Moreover, as
illustrated by the numerical analysis in the second section, the relative
strength of these e¡ects can be reversed by changes in a farmer's level of
seasonal variability. In particular, the greater this level is, the stronger is the
negative e¡ect on planned production.
Consequently, it is suggested that the introduction of protein payments is
more likely to have reduced planned production in areas of greater seasonal
variability and increased planned production in areas of less seasonal
variability. Moreover, recalling the conclusion of Fraser (1997), that the
introduction of protein payments is likely to have reduced the value of
wheat-growing land in more seasonally unreliable regions, provides an
additional source of negative supply response associated with such land
being withdrawn from wheat production due to ¢nancial pressures.
11 In so
doing, the AWB's protein payments system can be seen to have encouraged
overall a shift of wheat-growing activity away from more seasonally
unreliable regions of the wheatbelt.
10Further numerical analysis shows that this pattern of results is not sensitive to the size
either of the critical protein band width or of the protein premium/discount. In each case a
variation in size a¡ects the magnitude of the two terms on the left-hand side of equation
10 similarly. However, an asymmetrical positioning of the critical protein levels will either
increase or decrease the relative strength of the negative e¡ect on marginal expected pro¢t.
Consequently, if a premium is considerably more likely than a discount, then even a farmer
with sy  0:6 may exhibit a positive supply response. While if a discount is considerably
more likely than a premium, then even a farmer with sy  0:4 may exhibit a negative supply
response.
11I am grateful to the anonymous referee for making this connection.
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